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Toward a Genealogy of 
Americanist Expressionism
Ryan Carr
Yale University
In a 1910 lecture titled “The New Criticism,” Joel 
Spingarn announced that he had divined the master- concept that had 
made possible all signifi cant literary criticism of the past century.
But with the Romantic Movement there developed the new idea 
which coördinates all Criticism in the nineteenth century. Very early 
in the century, Mme. de Staël and others formulated the idea that 
Literature is an “expression of society.” Victor Cousin founded the 
school of art for art’s sake, enunciating “the fundamental rule, that 
expression is the supreme law of art.” Later, Sainte- Beuve devel-
oped and illustrated his theory that Literature is an expression of 
personality. Still later, under the infl uence of natural science, 
Taine took a hint from Hegel and elaborated the idea that Litera-
ture is an expression of race, age, and environment. The extreme 
impressionists prefer to think of art as the exquisite expression of 
delicate and fl uctuating sensations or impressions of life. But for 
all these critics and theorists, Literature is an expression of 
something, of experience or emotion, of the external or the 
internal, of the man himself or something outside the man; yet it 
is always conceived of as an art of expression.1
Spingarn’s capsule history, a founding moment of the literary- critical 
school that would soon be called “expressionism,” imposes unity upon a 
century of literary and cultural study that had moved in numerous, of-
ten orthogonal theoretical directions. By bringing fi gures as diverse as 
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Staël, Taine, and Sainte- Beuve under the same methodological umbrella, 
Spingarn sought to cut through the tangled web of intellectual history 
by uncovering a developing consensus that literature is expression be-
fore it is anything  else. And in this he was largely successful; as Gerald 
Graff recognizes in Professing Literature, Spingarn was a “disciplinary 
reformer” whose “desire to clean up the disorderly conceptual situation 
of criticism anticipated the project I. A. Richards would shortly initiate 
at Cambridge.”2 Nor was Spingarn the fi rst American literary scholar who 
found expression indispensible for formulating the discipline’s goals. In 
the fi rst number of the Transactions of the brand new Modern Language 
Association (later renamed PMLA), Theodore Hunt sought to vindicate 
the still- emerging fi eld of modern philology by insisting that “because 
of what the En glish is in itself as a language and literature . . .  all that is 
En glish must have ‘ample room and verge enough’ to give it its proper 
expression in the national history.”3 A few years later, Thomas Price 
would speak in his inaugural address as President of the MLA of “an in-
tense eagerness for personal expression in literature” and argue that the 
challenge facing En glish professors was to channel that natural desire 
into a properly disciplined receptivity to what he called “form.” 4 These 
scholars might not have gone quite as far as Spingarn in insisting that 
the concept of expression was identical with criticism’s very object of 
study and thus a disciplinary sine qua non, but together with Spingarn’s 
“The New Criticism,” they demonstrate that expression was crucial to 
the way the young profession formulated its aims, justifi ed itself to out-
siders (including potential majors), and differentiated itself from other 
kinds of inquiry.
The prominence of expression in the metacritical talk of these early 
literary scholars, notwithstanding their infl uence during a decisive pe-
riod of the discipline’s history, is apt to strike us today as strangely ata-
vistic. This is because, for most of the twentieth century, the major trends 
in literary theory  were almost all resolutely hostile to the identifi cation 
of literature with expression. This anti- expressionism dates back to the 
backlash against Spingarn himself. Despite or perhaps because of the 
fact that his thesis (“Literature is an expression of something . . .”) was 
so open- ended, placing so much emphasis upon the historical particu-
larities of utterance and so little upon objective standards of evaluation, 
scholars like Irving Babbitt accused him of propagating the notion that 
modern society was “a universe with the lid off,” a domain gripped by a 
“primitivism” in which man was condemned to an “indeterminate vaga-
bondage of imagination and emotion.”5 A few de cades later, the New Crit-
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ics would renew Babbitt’s anti- expressionism, updating his attack by 
proffering along with it an objective, scientistic criticism of the kind pi-
oneered by I. A. Richards. The philosophical rigor of the New Critics’ anti- 
expressionism is easy to underestimate. “Back of the many varieties of 
expressionist theory lies the assumption of the common or the distinct 
essence,” wrote Allen Tate in 1940, in an argument that anticipated the 
antisubjectivist critiques of expression that structuralist and poststruc-
turalist scholars would begin to fl esh out beginning in the 1960s.6 For 
all their differences, theorists like Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, and 
even Michel Foucault in his early work shared with Tate and other New 
Critics a worry that the concept of expression had for too long held the 
human and social sciences back from attaining a proper standard of 
conceptual rigor. Althusser, in what was perhaps the most spectacular 
document of twentieth- century anti- expressionism, referred to the “ex-
pressive totality” that Hegel had used to conceptualize the progress of 
history as a “religious complicity between Logos and Being,” one of “those 
tacit pacts in which the men of a still fragile age secured themselves 
with magical alliances against the precariousness of history.”7 In talking 
about expression in this way, Althusser didn’t necessarily mean the same 
thing by the term as Tate and company, but he would have agreed with 
Babbitt himself that the currency of expression in mainstream critical 
discourse was proof that “society is plainly suffering from a lack rather 
than a superabundance of discipline and restraint.” 8
Americanist critics, over the period I’ve just been surveying and in-
deed up to the present, have distinguished themselves from other liter-
ary scholars by refusing to be bothered by the conceptual problems other 
theorists have raised with expression. Ludwig Lewisohn, one of the fi rst 
specialists in American texts, was a devoted partisan of expression. Re-
viewing the Spingarn– Babbitt disputation in his monumental Expression 
in America, he would write that “both  were pleading pro domo within 
the framework of America; the one was seeking to preserve the Amer-
ica of his fathers; the other was seeking to conquer America for his 
children.”9 Lewisohn was surely wrong to think that Babbitt’s anti- 
expressionism was a thing of the past, as the New Critics  were already 
in the pro cess of showing. But when his argument is read more nar-
rowly as a statement about scholars of American literature working in 
the United States, Lewisohn was surely onto something, as the writ-
ings of F. O. Matthiessen— not least American Re nais sance: Art and Ex-
pression in the Age of Emerson an Whitman— would most famously 
demonstrate. Like Lewisohn, Matthiessen thought his advocacy of 
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expression put him on the right side of his discipline’s history. Although 
he tended to avoid polemics, no contemporary specialist would have 
missed the import of Matthiessen’s approving citation in American Re-
nais sance of Benedetto Croce, the Italian aes the ti cian whom the New 
Critics had blamed for having introduced the doctrine of expression onto 
the American scene, and whom Joel Spingarn had praised throughout 
his career for precisely the same reason. Just as confi dently as the New 
Critics  were insisting that expression had no place in the business of 
literary studies, Matthiessen resolved to keep it front and center.
In the years since American Re nais sance, many have challenged 
Matthiessen, but no one has found reason to reproach his commitment 
to expression, or the expressionist point of view that he took over from 
Spingarn and Lewisohn. Even at the height of deconstruction, expres-
sion retained a degree of currency among Americanists whose sympa-
thies otherwise aligned with this most quintessentially anti- expressionist 
movement. Writing in Diacritics in 1977, Kenneth Dauber synthesized 
expressionism and deconstruction, arguing of the canonical nineteenth- 
century texts D. H. Lawrence had called “classics” that “the work was 
not its author’s. It could never express him, could never express anything 
but itself. And so he took his stand between works. He gave over the writ-
ten for writing. Meaning became a function, no longer an idea to be 
located within the text, but an operation, the act of producing texts 
instead.”10 In a gesture that would be repeated by the multiculturalist crit-
ics of the Canon Wars (to whom I will return later), Dauber rectifi ed ex-
pressionism by bringing it up to date. About certain things, he shows, 
the tradition of Croce and Spingarn must have been wrong. Expression-
ism as those innovators imagined it was too idealist: the meaning of the 
world does not originate in the minds of subjects, and it’s only by virtue 
of a par tic u lar “language game” that anyone ever thought that literature 
could represent such subjects’ interiority. Nevertheless, expression 
as a “pro cess” does not disappear. The text uncannily and ineluctably 
“expresses . . .  itself” against the backdrop of the author’s own ex-
pressive frustration, his “giving over” of the agency of signifi cation to 
discourse itself. Expression— what ordinary readers sometimes mis-
conceive as free self- disclosure—is really an unending “transaction” 
between a subject and circulating discourse: this was the compromise 
Dauber effected between deconstruction and Americanist criticism, a 
discipline that, at its best, had always been characterized by “a pre- 
theoretical recognition of the nonobjectivity of the text.”11 Purged of its 
folksy metaphysics of the subject, the study of expression survived the 
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rise of poststructuralism as a dramatics of subjectivity understood as 
a discursive strategy.
Why should this be? Where does Americanists’ “pre- theoretical rec-
ognition” of expression’s signifi cance come from, and what makes the 
concept of expression so effective as part of the technical repertoire of 
modern critical knowledge? A satisfying discussion of the topic is far be-
yond the scope of present essay, for whose purposes it will hopefully suf-
fi ce to enumerate three overlapping factors. The fi rst is that Americanist 
critics, part and parcel of their broader society, have tended to affi rm 
expression as a norm, a pressure toward self- creation that guides the con-
duct of individual subjects. This norm is profoundly historical, as the phi-
los o pher Charles Taylor has done more than anyone  else to demonstrate; 
and yet it is often spoken about as if it  were a natural drive or impulse—
as in Theodore Hunt’s comment, cited above, about his student’s quasi- 
libidinous “eagerness for personal expression in literature.”12 Today, the 
imaginary naturalness of expression’s normativity frequently mani-
fests itself in the assumption that expression is an intrinsic human 
right, freedom, or faculty that has always existed, even though our mod-
ern, secular society has only in the last few centuries gotten around to 
discovering it.
Expression also serves critics as a principle of selection, a way of 
defi ning and legitimating a fi eld of collective inquiry. Consider the titles 
not just of Lewisohn’s Expression in America or Matthiessen’s treatise 
on Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman but also 
of Arnold Krupat’s All That Remains: Varieties of Indigenous Expres-
sion (2009), or of the 2014 conference “African American Expression in 
Print and Digital Culture” held at the University of Wisconsin. Such ti-
tles exemplify a protocol of canonization that confers critical meaning 
by abstracting the text christened “expressive” from its initial scene of 
utterance.13 To be sure, this principle of selection has become since Mat-
thiessen’s time increasingly ecumenical, encompassing an ever- expanding 
array of subjects, genres, and media of expression. But it is a principle 
of selection nonetheless. Americanists have not historically made it their 
business to silence the past.
Finally, the critical protocols and normative pressures that drive 
Americanist scholars to see the texts they study as expressive are re-
fl exive, bearing on the activity of knowledge itself. They help scholars 
to identify objects of criticism but also to locate themselves as subjects 
that stand in a relation of solidarity to those objects. To speak of a text 
as “expressive” implies the existence of a mediated social space in which 
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authors and interpreters can discover a likeness in one another; as Shel-
don Pollock has argued, “Creating or consuming literature meant for large 
worlds or small places is a declaration of affi liation with that world or 
place . . .  The practices of literary culture . . .  are practices of attach-
ment.”14 The textually mediated attachments cultivated by Americanist 
criticism are not natural; they come into being alongside other forms of 
solidarity that literary belonging may or may not displace. To study (and 
teach) expression in the twenty- fi rst century is to declare one’s affi liation 
to a large world in which solidarities circulate among strangers, a world 
in which subjectivity and textuality blur into one another at every turn.
For Americanists, the upshot of these overlapping societal and dis-
ciplinary understandings is that expression, plainly put, works: the term 
is part and parcel of modern Americanist criticism, tripping off the tongue 
in ways that would have been inconceivable even as recently as the nine-
teenth century. Consider, for instance, Hilary Wyss’s claim in Writing 
Indians that “those Natives who did write, no matter what they wrote, 
fundamentally altered the relationship between missionary culture and 
Native people through the simple act of self- expression.”15 None of the 
writers Wyss studies referred to what they wrote as “self- expression.” 
Many of them, in fact, would have repudiated the notion that their writ-
ings  were part of a pro cess of verbal self- creation, or, at least, they would 
have denied that this aspect of their writing was the thing that any audi-
ence ought to focus on. It requires a leap of critical imagination to say 
that a corpus of early Native writings largely made up of deeds, contracts, 
devotional exercises, and writing drills can be unifi ed owing to their in-
stantiation of “the simple act of self- expression.” Yet this is a leap Amer-
icanists have long been trained to make. It is a leap that Matthiessen 
himself made throughout American Re nais sance, where he deliberately, 
painstakingly, and often counterintuitively assimilated his fi ve great au-
thors to an understanding of expression that they themselves would fre-
quently have contested.
This discontinuity between past and present conceptions of creative 
speech— and, in the case of American Re nais sance, between antebel-
lum and twentieth- century understandings of “expression”—is constitu-
tive of the confi guration of critical knowledge that this essay will be 
referring to as “expressionism.” The discontinuity has frequently gone 
unremarked by historians of expression; yet this, in itself, is not the prob-
lem this essay seeks to address. Expressionism is not a prejudice veil-
ing the truth of history but a form of truth- telling we’ve forgotten we 
 Ryan Carr · Toward a Genealogy of Americanist Expressionism 95
J19
learned, what Foucault might have called a “buried” knowledge.16 What 
follows is the sketch of a genealogy of Americanist expressionism: an at-
tempt to recover this knowledge and its constitutive discontinuities, to 
show how it came to be buried, and to suggest some of the ways in which 
the history of expression might inform an understanding of Americanist 
criticism’s recent past and unfolding present.
* * *
Expressionism, throughout the history of Americanist criticism, has been 
both a protocol of knowledge- making and a structure of forgetting. A 
clear example of this dual function is the title page of Ludwig Lewisohn’s 
Expression in America with its epigraph,
All men live by truth, and stand in need of expression . . .  . The 
man is half himself, the other half is his expression. — EMERSON17
Surely the fact that man is “half . . .  his expression” matters greatly for 
Emerson, but so too, just as surely, does the fact that he is “half him-
self” even without expression. For Lewisohn, though (as for Matthiessen 
later), the expressive half of man was the  whole story, and thus Emer-
son’s aphorism could be read as an unambivalent document of the ep-
ochal nineteenth- century shift in which “an old crack in that rigid shell 
which was supposed to represent the universe suddenly burst,” and ex-
pression made its long- overdue entrance onto the stage of world history.18 
What’s forgotten in this reading is not only the half of Emerson’s “man” 
that is not his expression but also the fact that Emerson’s putative ex-
pressionism refl ected twentieth- century critical priorities that claimed 
to be universal but  were in fact highly selective. No one lived by these 
priorities more clearly than Matthiessen, for whom self- expression was 
both an aesthetic category and a principle of personal conduct; he ad-
mired Emerson not just as a writer but as the American whom he saw 
as having “made one of the most challenging quests for a form that would 
express his deepest convictions.”19 The force of Matthiessen’s reading of 
Emerson cannot be distinguished from the urgency with which he seeks 
to persuade his readers that expression was an indispensible concept 
and practice for the historical present. But in Emerson’s own time, 
expression was still a topic to be treated with carefully cultivated 
ambivalence.
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For Emerson, the term “expression” was bound up with problems 
that  were at once social and semiotic, problems that refl ected Transcen-
dentalism’s status as a social movement whose participants aspired to 
spiritual perfection outside the ritual frameworks of actually existing in-
stitutions. As Anne C. Rose wrote of Emerson in the period following 
his resignation of the pastorship at Boston’s Second Church, “He did not 
lose his faith . . .  , but he had no adequate way to explain or express his 
religious feelings.”20 The semiotic diffi culty posed by Emerson’s self- 
imposed exile from Christian frameworks of verbal interaction (his loss 
of a “way to explain or express his religious feelings”) was compounded 
by the naturalistic regimen of nonverbal receptivity—of “observation,” 
“experience,” and “intuition”— that he cultivated in his dealings with 
Nature.
Consider again the claim from Emerson’s “The Poet,” cited in Lewis-
ohn’s epigraph, that “all men . . .  stand in need of expression.” Now, it’s 
true that this can be read, along Lewisohn’s or Matthiessen’s lines, as 
identifying expression as an innate drive whose fulfi llment is a natural 
goal of human life. But this doesn’t do justice to the defamiliarizing odd-
ity of the phrase, which casts man as a kind of standing reservoir, not 
unlike a cow that “stands in need of” milking. In the context of the broader 
essay, the image suggests that poetry is a kind of husbandry: the poet’s 
purpose is to “express” us—or, perhaps, to help us express ourselves. 
Emerson isn’t especially clear about which, but that’s not a problem for 
his argument, since it becomes clear over the course of the essay that 
the real topic of the essay is not expression but the prelinguistic recep-
tivities that attune the poet to the natural world around him: “touch,” 
“impression,” and “intuition.” It’s that receptivity, Emerson wants us to 
see, that “man” has become really bad at; the function of the Poet’s ex-
pression, above all, is not to dazzle us with the wonders of his verbal 
per for mance but to make us aware of all the things we’ve missed. “The 
young man reveres men of genius,” Emerson writes, “because, to speak 
truly, they are more himself than he is. They receive of the soul as he 
also receives, but they more.”21 So what, given the primacy of receptivity 
in Emerson’s understanding of poetry, does “man” ’s animalistic “need of 
expression” amount to? Not much, on its own, even for the poet himself, 
whom Emerson declares to be “representative,” thanks to the pureness 
of his intuition of Nature’s innate signifi cance.
The questions facing such a person are the same ones Emerson faced 
as an out- of- work minister: how does one locate expression as a social 
practice? Upon what footing and in what context is the “man of genius” 
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to address the rest of society? Emerson toys with the idea that the Poet 
might fulfi ll the pastoral function that he himself had renounced when 
he resigned his post at Boston’s Second Church: “I look in vain for the 
poet I describe,” he writes, as if to suggest that a new leader might still 
be around the corner.22 But this fantasy runs afoul of his insistence that 
a man’s worth comes not from what he says to others but from what he 
sees for himself. This, after all, was the point of Emerson’s leaving the 
church in the fi rst place; as he had written in the “Divinity School Ad-
dress,” “intuition . . .  cannot be received at second hand.”23 His famous 
lament makes the poet seem responsible for failing to manifest himself, 
but it’s really Emerson who has failed to imagine a place for him in his 
new social world.
In his early writings, Emerson dedicates himself to the philosophi-
cal problem of how the social- spiritual movement of Transcendentalism 
ought to harness man’s inner propensity for speech, his “need of ex-
pression.” His concern is with verbal tactics for the here- and- now, with 
furthering the transformation he sees at work in the nineteenth- century 
world by asking how men and women can help one another to experi-
ence that world at “fi rst hand.” By the end of his career, though, he has 
given up hope that modern society will yield up any one person who, by 
the simple act of expression, can lead the masses to the redemptive in-
tuition they so desperately need. In Representative Men, “The Poet,” 
Shakespeare, speaks from the past to the present through the deep 
time of Nature. There’s something appealingly archaic about his “power 
of expression, of transferring the inmost truth of things into music and 
verse,” a power that likens him to “some saint whose history is to be 
rendered into all languages, into verse and prose, into songs and pic-
tures, and cut up into proverbs; so that the occasion which gave the 
saint’s meaning the form . . .  is immaterial, compared with the univer-
sality of its application.”24 It is irrelevant to Emerson what, historically 
or biographically speaking, occasioned Shakespeare’s speech: “the oc-
casion . . .  is immaterial.” Nor does Emerson ask whether Shakespeare 
“stood in need of expression” in the same way that “all men” seem to in 
the present day. For Emerson, what distinguishes the Poet of the past 
from the mere “Writer” of the present (Goethe) is that the past Poet never 
found himself in the predicament facing modern individuals, of “standing 
in need” of expression but not necessarily having an “occasion” to give 
“form” to “meaning.” Such an occasion can only be provided by the ap-
perception of Nature’s truth, Emerson insists in opposition to those mod-
ern men who assume that a desire for self- culture can serve as suffi cient 
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reason for expressing oneself. It’s owing to modernity’s constant pro-
duction of this spuriously occasioned speech that Emerson is so am-
bivalent about Goethe. “If he can not rightly express himself to- day, the 
same things subsist and will open themselves to- morrow. There lies the 
burden on his mind— the burden of truth to be declared,— more or less 
understood.”25 The problem to which Goethe’s work testifi es is that the 
“truth” tends, in the present day, always to be “less understood.” The truth, 
for Goethe (and other writers like him), is the mere truth of himself; and 
thus, Emerson writes, “Goethe can never be dear to men. His is not even 
the devotion to pure truth, but to truth for the sake of culture . . .  The 
idea of absolute, eternal truth, without reference to my own enlargement 
by it, is higher. The surrender to the torrent of poetic inspiration is 
higher.”26
What redeems Goethe in Emerson’s eyes— the reason he “fi nd[s] a 
provision” for him “in the constitution of the world”—is not his “power 
of expression” but his power of being “provoking to the mind,” of offer-
ing “so many unexpected glimpses into a higher sphere,” and thus of pro-
viding the attentive reader with a cause (“pro- ”) for speech (“- vocation”) 
that is ultimately more valuable for Emerson than the subject providing 
it.27 Emerson’s reading of Goethe as an agent of “provocation” can be un-
derstood as a facet of the “way of life by abandonment” that Sharon Cam-
eron and Branka Arsic have shown to be Emerson’s habitual way of 
dealing with the world, for, by declining to countenance Goethe’s aspi-
ration for “self- culture,” Emerson is effectively abandoning him.28 To ob-
serve that Emerson responds to Goethe’s provocation by means of 
abandonment is to confront, once again, the impossibility of determin-
ing the social location of expression in Emerson’s writings, an impossi-
bility that arises  here not just because of Emerson’s refusal of the mode 
of modern solidarity Goethe’s model of expressive self- culture entails 
but also because, as Emerson argues elsewhere, it is perfectly possible 
to provoke oneself in the absence of other people. The kind of self- 
forgetting that Emerson describes in “Circles,” for instance, can itself 
be understood as a kind of provocation: one discovers an occasion for 
further speech (for “draw[ing] a new circle”) by demystifying oneself 
of one’s own personality. This provoking practice of self- renunciation 
is the opposite of what Matthiessen had in mind when he spoke of 
“expression.”
We fi nd a more concrete iteration of the Transcendentalists’ ethics 
of provocation in the life of Henry David Thoreau. I say “life” and not 
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“works” because, as Pierre Hadot argued, Thoreau was not in the fi rst 
instance a maker of philosophical arguments but rather the practitioner 
of a “spiritual discipline” whose goal was to regiment talk according to 
the demands of Nature: as Hadot writes, “The true problem was not to 
write, but to live in the woods, to be capable of supporting such an ex-
perience . . .  this plunging into the heart of nature. In other words, the 
philosophical act transcends the literary work that expresses it; and this 
literary work cannot totally express what Thoreau has lived.”29 It was 
this  whole discipline— this experience of having “lived” in a way that sub-
ordinated expression to action— that Thoreau sought to communicate 
to his readers. And since this discipline is predicated fundamentally 
upon the regimentation of talk by that which is beyond talk, Thoreau 
fi nds himself drawn repeatedly to the language of paradox, as in his two- 
line poem in A Week:
My life has been the poem I would have writ
But I could not both live and utter it.30
In American Re nais sance, F. O. Matthiessen claimed Thoreau as an an-
tecedent to expressionism by reading these lines as examples of the plain 
and direct style that resulted from their author’s “desire to break down 
all artifi cial divisions between art and living.”31 A more intuitive read-
ing would be that the lines are the clearest case of the normative am-
bivalence of Thoreau’s talk, which he designs to refl ect the volatile 
simultaneity of two domains, life and poetry, that he experiences as 
pulling him in opposite directions. On the one hand, the poem registers 
his profoundest ambition to become what none of his peers had had the 
audacity to be: a silent Transcendentalist, purifi ed of any accountabil-
ity to an audience. On the other, by mockingly vesting himself with 
the heroism of the heroic couplet, Thoreau communicates in a self- 
consciously conventional way the necessity of speaking, if he will speak 
at all, within the bounds of convention. For Thoreau, the notion of a di-
rect poetics of expressive self- manifestation is an illusion that must be 
dispelled at every turn. Thoreau’s spiritual discipline requires that he 
situate himself upon the boundary between life and expression and, from 
that footing, demonstrate the urgency of crossing out of one domain and 
into another.
The opening of Walking clarifi es why Thoreau thinks life and talk 
about life are necessarily at odds, such that one might fi nd oneself 
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compelled to choose between them. “I wish to speak a word for Nature,” 
he writes,
for absolute Freedom and Wildness, as contrasted with a freedom 
and Culture merely civil,—to regard man as an inhabitant, or a 
part and parcel of Nature, rather than a member of society. I wish 
to make an extreme statement, if so I may make an emphatic one, 
for there are enough champions of civilization; the minister, and 
the school- committee, and every one of you will take care of 
that.32
To take part in Thoreau’s naturalism, one must subject one’s conscious-
ness to a shift in perspective that allows one to view from the standpoint 
of “Nature” those phenomena that the “champions of Civilization” had 
claimed to master. This shift in perspective allows one to undertake a 
methodological reduction of Civilization to Nature. It is to this end Walk-
ing rehearses a natural history of humanity, beginning with Thoreau’s 
observation of his irrepressible inclination to walk in a westerly direc-
tion. Inferring that this westering inclination is a general characteristic 
of the human species, he goes on to suggest that, in America, “there is 
perhaps one more chance for the race left before it arrives on the banks 
of the Styx; and that is in the Lethe of the Pacifi c.”33 In order to make the 
most of this chance, humans must learn to appreciate and preserve “wild-
ness,” for it is only by experiencing wildness that man can learn a truth 
about himself that the “champions of civilization” can never hope to 
teach— that man is “part and parcel of Nature”— even though they think 
they have a comprehensive understanding of Nature, which they call “sci-
ence.” From Thoreau’s perspective, the kind of knowledge made possi-
ble by science is not wrong, but it is incorrectly expressed. As he writes 
in his journal,
If I am overfl owing with life, am rich in experience for which I lack 
expression, then nature will be my language full of poetry— all 
nature will be fable, and every natural phenomenon be a myth. 
The man of science, who is not seeking for expression but for a 
fact to be expressed merely, studies nature as a dead language. 
I pray for such inward experience as will make nature signifi cant.34
Scientifi c knowledge, for Thoreau, is a kind of undisciplined talk: “the 
man of science” assumes that scientifi c language represents living na-
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ture, but that repre sen ta tion, since it is sanctioned by Civilization, is 
“dead.” According to the expressive discipline that Thoreau models, man 
must accept that, owing to the sheer mass of impressions and intuitions 
that Nature constantly makes available, it is in the nature of “experience” 
for man to “lack expression.” To render one’s gratitude for nature’s “lan-
guage full of poetry” as compensation for man’s “lack [of] expression” is 
to acknowledge that expression is “part and parcel” of a totality that can-
not be communicated according to Civilized protocols. As a faculty of 
Nature, expression belongs outside of civilization, and man must face 
the fact that its powers exceed his potential to harness them.
Thoreau solves the Transcendentalist problem of expression’s social 
location by insisting that it has none, at least among the “civil.” This leaves 
open the possibility that expression might serve as a medium of com-
munication among the “champions” of Nature; but he rejects this possi-
bility as well. Even more vehemently than Emerson, Thoreau insists that 
one can only experience Nature alone. In the opening of Walking, Tho-
reau prepares to prove that he is “part and parcel of nature, rather than 
a member of society” by turning his back on all the “champions of civi-
lization,” a collective that includes not just “the minister, and the school- 
committee” but also “every one of you.” Thoreau thus, paradoxically 
again, recruits us as followers of his Natural way of life by insisting that 
he must abandon us, and by making it incumbent upon us to abandon 
him in return, along with everyone  else we know: “If you are ready to 
leave father and mother, and brother and sister, and wife and child and 
friends, and never see them again—if you have paid your debts, and made 
your will, and settled all your affairs, and are a free man— then you are 
ready for a walk.”35 Thoreau does everything in his power to prepare us 
to take this step but insists that we take it by ourselves, since there’s no 
such thing as a collective agent of abandonment. The only fellowship en-
joyed by the champions of Nature comes from the shared realization that 
they are outsiders to one another. “I desire to speak somewhere with-
out bounds,” he writes in the conclusion of Walden, “like a man in a wak-
ing moment, to men in their waking moments; for I am convinced that I 
cannot exaggerate enough even to lay the foundation of a true expres-
sion.”36 To speak to someone in a “waking moment” is to speak with a 
voice that seems to come from nowhere— which must necessarily be 
where Natural man, in relation to his fellow men, fi nds himself. As a com-
pensation for the impossibility of “true expression,” for direct commu-
nication with his fellow men, Thoreau settles for “extra- vagant . . . 
exaggeration,” for allowing himself to be merely overheard. For  expression 
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itself to become communicative, the still- unredeemed Civilization of 
the Transcendentalists would have to be left behind for one that was a 
continuation of Nature, rather than a “second- hand” excrescence of it.
* * *
When Walt Whitman told Emerson (and everyone  else) in the preface to 
the 1856 Leaves of Grass that “the work of my life is making poems,” he 
meant not just to echo Thoreau (“My life has been the poem I would have 
writ / But I could not both live and utter it.”) but to outdo him and Emer-
son both, to announce himself as having fi nally discovered a social lo-
cation for expression.37 After all, Whitman asked, why shouldn’t life and 
the poetry of life coincide with one another? One has only to understand 
the work of the poet’s life in the right way, as an activity of mediation 
undertaken on behalf of both Nature and Civilization. A life- long deni-
zen of print shops, Whitman knew that the work of circulating poetry 
was a collective labor involving not just the publication and distribution 
of printed materials but also the uptake of utterance in the hands of read-
ers: again, “the work of my life is making poems. I keep on till I make a 
hundred, and then several hundred— perhaps a thousand. The way is 
clear to me. A few years, and the average annual call for my Poems is 
ten or twenty thousand copies— more, quite likely.”38 The fact that the 
masses  were clamoring for his poetry (at least in his imagination) did 
not signify for Whitman a craven appetite for “second- hand” experience 
but rather the existence of thousands of future cameradoes. This is 
the key discontinuity between the Ages of Emerson and Whitman: self- 
expression, for Whitman, does not entail a loss of fi delity to Nature’s 
originary meaningfulness.
Like Emerson and Thoreau, Whitman saw expression as an activity 
that must be subjected to discipline in the ser vice of social and spiritual 
progress; but for Whitman expression was not something that had to be 
economized out of life, as it had been for Thoreau especially. As Allen 
Grossman wrote of Whitman, “The bard distributes the value of person-
hood which is the value commuted in all other economic transactions.”39 
In Thoreau’s view, one has to make time for life fi rst and foremost, which 
will never leave one enough time to write the poem of one’s life. But for 
Whitman there’s no need to minimize expression because (as Americans 
had learned of paper money during the fi nancial crises of the 1830s) one 
can always print more. By 1855, the rules of the game have changed. The 
purpose of disciplining expression is not to focus on the other things one 
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could be doing but to extend one’s discursive presence as broadly as pos-
sible. As Grossman and a long line of critics following him have recog-
nized, the new kind of “presence” made possible by circulating discourse 
is Whitman’s fundamental poetic discovery, one he deploys in his verse 
again and again. As he writes in “Song of the Open Road,” “I and mine 
do not convince by arguments, similes, rhymes, / We convince by our pres-
ence.” 40 In “Song of Myself,” Whitman demonstrates what’s involved in 
such “convincing” by drawing attention to the ineluctable antecedence 
of voice (“I . . .”) to diegesis (“. . . celebrate myself and sing myself.”), and 
in the space of diegesis itself, by impressing upon his readers their com-
plicity in the reproduction of the expressive presence he brings about:
My words itch at your ears till you understand them. . . .  
(It is you talking just as much as myself, I act as the tongue of you,
Tied in your mouth, in mine it begins to be loosen’d.)41
Presence, for Whitman, is by defi nition co- presence. It circulates between 
the poet and his reader in such a way as to create a new kind of subject, 
immanent to discourse. Whitman underscores the newness of this sub-
ject in the preface to the 1855 Leaves of Grass where he urges his read-
ers to consider his poems not as reproductions of himself (“What I 
experience or portray shall go from my composition without a shred of 
my composition”) but rather as the expressive manifestations of a new 
kind of collective self: “You shall stand by my side and look in the mirror 
at me,” Whitman tells his readers, recruiting them into the transcen-
dence of their own individuality.42
What makes this collective self- manifestation worthwhile? Like 
Emerson and Thoreau, Whitman knew that poetry required a provoca-
tion. For Whitman, that provocation was provided by life’s struggle 
against limitations. It was “in an attempt to exceed or ‘go beyond’ the 
modes of representing human embodiment in the discourse of his age,” 
as Michael Moon has argued, that “Whitman set himself the problem of 
attempting to project actual physical presence in a literary text.” 43 Ac-
cording to Moon, Whitman’s experience of these limitations—be they 
po liti cal, sexual, or literary— was an effect of society’s enforcement of a 
regime of “bodilessness” and shame. But it’s also possible to read Whit-
man as suggesting that such limitations are not simply a matter of soci-
ety forcing itself upon life, with the individual subject vested with the 
responsibility of re sis tance, but also, and in the fi rst instance, of life’s 
capacity to constrain itself and thereby to force upon subjects the 
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responsibility for overcoming its own self- generated barriers. It’s this 
responsibility that Whitman asserts in the climactic stanza of “As I 
Ebb’d with the Ocean of Life”:
O baffl ed, balk’d, bent to the very earth,
Oppress’d with myself that I have dared to open my mouth,
Aware now that amid all that blab whose echoes recoil upon me 
I have not once had the least idea who or what I am,
But that before all my arrogant poems the real Me stands yet 
untouch’d, untold, altogether unreach’d, . . .  
Nature  here in sight of the sea taking advantage of me to dart 
upon me and sting me,
Because I have dared to open my mouth to sing at all.44
Whitman  here dramatizes a pro cess of becoming “oppress’d with myself” 
that is occasioned by expression itself—by “my arrogant poems,” which 
are felt to enforce their own mode of self- repression. That the poems as-
sume this aspect is an effect of the passage of time. As we have already 
seen, Whitman is concerned to avoid a poetics of self- representation 
since, like Emerson, he refuses to see the self as a stable referent. This 
is why, looking back on his past writings, he can’t help but be appalled 
by their recrudescent repre sen ta tional stability. In the present moment, 
those very poems that had once “convince[d] by our presence” now bring 
about the very self- alienation they had once overcome (“before all my 
arrogant poems the real Me stands yet untouch’d, untold, altogether 
unreach’d”). Realizing that any single poem is incapable of permanently 
forestalling this temporal de- presencing on its own terms, Whitman 
never theless fi nds meaning in his own belatedness by fi guring poetry as 
a pro cess of self- following, a reappropriation of life’s cast- off materials: 
“I gather for myself and for this phantom looking down where we lead, 
and following me and mine.” It’s possible to interpret this self- gathering 
as a compensatory fantasy, a concealment of the speaker’s inability to 
reconcile external psychosocial pressures.45 But such a reading, ulti-
mately, fails to confront what is perhaps the most diffi cult question Whit-
man’s poetry raises, which is whether repression is always an effect of 
heteronomy, whether it isn’t generated out of the same natural pro cess 
that gives rise to expression itself. “As I Ebb’d with the Ocean of Life” 
can thus be read as dramatizing not just the self- “oppression” Whitman 
experiences as a consequence of his past utterances but also his refusal 
to see himself as internalizing a preexisting symbolic order, since any 
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such order can always be seen as retrospectively constituted from the 
perspective of the “following” present. Expression has become the se-
miotic modality of life’s progressive reconstitution of itself.
The presentness of Whitman’s expressive “gathering” can helpfully 
be contrasted to the temporal scheme of intuition and expression that 
characterizes the writings of Emerson and Thoreau. In the conclusion to 
Walden, Thoreau had written,
I am convinced that I cannot exaggerate enough even to lay the 
foundation of a true expression. Who that has heard a strain of 
music feared then lest he should speak extravagantly any more 
forever? In view of the future or possible, we should live quite 
laxly and undefi ned in front, our outlines dim and misty on that 
side; as our shadows reveal an insensible perspiration toward the 
sun. The volatile truth of our words should continually betray 
the inadequacy of the residual statement.46
Truth, for Thoreau, “betrays” the impossibility of “true expression” be-
cause it antecedes expression, both logically and temporally; it is closer 
to Nature, the permanent source of all meaning. It is in tribute to that 
antecedent source, Thoreau thinks, that “we should live quite laxly and 
undefi ned in front, our outlines dim and misty on that side.” For Whit-
man, by contrast, our experience of the world is always less “defi ned” 
than the expression that gathers it into discourse. In “As I Ebb’d With 
the Ocean of Life,” the defi ning power of poetic expression is the means 
through which the self overcomes the failure of self- understanding that 
its own prior utterances had occasioned, thereby reconstituting for it-
self an open future. Later, in Demo cratic Vistas, Whitman would antici-
pate that the third and culminating stage of progress in the United States, 
“rising out of the previous ones, to make them and all illustrious,” would 
begin with the “announcing [of] a native expression- spirit.” 47 He found 
that he could apply his conception of expression as a future- oriented pro-
cess of self- gathering to social experience on every possible scale.
* * *
Whitman’s theorization of expression as an agency of social mediation 
was a development that Emerson and Thoreau could scarcely have imag-
ined. Yet it was precisely this understanding of expression that would 
gain ground over the second half of the nineteenth century, not just among 
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poets like Whitman but in a wide variety of speech genres including, by 
the end of the century, the disciplinary discourses of the human sci-
ences.48 The literary- historical gesture, for instance, through which Joel 
Spingarn read the intellectual history of the nineteenth century as a uni-
fi ed affi rmation of expression itself (“For all these critics, literature is 
the expression of something . . .”) can now be seen as an eminently Whit-
manian one. For Spingarn, as for Whitman, expression was a refl exive 
practice of solidarity that ushered in a new era of interpretation: as he 
argued in “The New Criticism,” “Criticism at last can free itself of its age- 
long self- contempt, now that it may realize that aesthetic judgment and 
artistic creation are instinct with the same vital life.” Spingarn called the 
sort of scholarship made possible by this realization “creative criticism” 
and, like Whitman, theorized reading as a mode of discursive co- presence 
that created a bond of solidarity between writer and reader. As he put it, 
in the terminology of his day, “Taste must reproduce the work of art 
within itself in order to understand and judge it; and at that moment aes-
thetic judgment becomes nothing more nor less than creative art itself.” 49 
Whitman’s provocation, “And what I assume, you shall assume,” was now 
a protocol of disciplinary knowledge.50
Whitman’s continuity with Spingarn marks his discontinuity with the 
Transcendentalists: there was no unifi ed “Art . . .  [of] Expression in the 
Age of Emerson and Whitman.” Still, the case of Spingarn can help us 
understand why Matthiessen thought there was. Matthiessen’s compen-
dium of expression in American Re nais sance is not, after all, that dif-
ferent from Spingarn’s intellectual history of the nineteenth century, 
which forged often irreconcilable views into a univocal consensus. Nor 
did Matthiessen’s history of expression restrict itself to the period and 
authors covered in American Re nais sance. In The Achievement of T. S. 
Eliot (1935), Matthiessen assimilated Eliot himself to the tradition of ex-
pressionism that he would only later trace back to the antebellum United 
States. This text has been widely misunderstood as evidence of Matthies-
sen’s “formalism” or “modernism.” In “Nationalizing the New Criticism” 
(1996) Evan Carton and Gerald Graff interpreted Matthiessen’s enthusi-
asm for Eliot as a methodological endorsement of the New Critics, for 
whom Eliot was also a seminal fi gure: all these thinkers  were part of 
the same “modernist and New Critical generation.”51 Graff and Carton’s 
history refl ected a widespread consensus among Americanists since 
the 1980s that Eliot, Matthiessen, and the New Critics all sought to pri-
oritize form at the expense of history. The way to arrive at a more faith-
ful understanding of the nineteenth century, it was argued during and 
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after the Canon Wars, was to ignore the distorting fi lters imposed by 
Matthiessen and other literary modernists during the fi rst half of the 
twentieth.
One outcome of revisionists’ confl ation of Matthiessen and the New 
Critics was the forgetting of a highly consequential debate that took 
place between them on the topic of expression in T. S. Eliot’s theory 
of poetry. In fact, The Achievement of T. S. Eliot was a thinly veiled at-
tack on the New Critics’ anti- expressionist reading of Eliot, which 
pointed literary criticism down a path Matthiessen was determined not 
to follow. Matthiessen’s expressionist reading of Eliot was an effort to 
seize him away from the New Critics, and in so doing to vindicate an ex-
pressionist way of reading that was avowedly modern but not at all “Mod-
ernist” in the ahistorical sense of the term that later Americanists would 
associate with the “generation” of the New Criticism. On the contrary, 
according to Matthiessen’s reading of Eliot, expression, and the refl ex-
ive history of expression,  were ways of coping with the specifi c histori-
cal problems modernity posed. The Achievement of T. S. Eliot is a critical 
text for a genealogy of expressionism, then, for two reasons: fi rst, it shows 
that Matthiessen was not a New Critic and thus prepares us to see how, 
by misrecognizing him as such, later revisionists would let his expres-
sionism (which they frequently shared) pass as perfectly natural; and sec-
ond, it clarifi es the historical understanding of expression that would 
motivate Matthiessen’s later reinvention of himself as a champion of 
American democracy in American Re nais sance.
Matthiessen and the New Critics could agree to disagree about T. S. 
Eliot because Eliot’s own writings on the topic of expression  were deeply 
ambivalent and sometimes mutually contradictory. The anti- expressionist 
side of Eliot’s writings is perhaps best encapsulated in the thesis from 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent” that “poetry is . . .  not the expres-
sion of personality, but an escape from personality.”52 For Eliot, the iden-
tifi cation of poetry with the “expression of personality” mistakenly 
assumes that persons are capable of referring to their thoughts and emo-
tions. In opposition to this naive view, Eliot holds that our most intense 
emotions are unrepresentable because they themselves have no deter-
minable referent. “The intense feeling, ecstatic or terrible, without an ob-
ject or exceeding its object” simply cannot be represented as a feature 
of an individual’s personality; as Eliot famously puts it, “The only way 
of expressing emotion in the form of art is by fi nding an ‘objective cor-
relative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events 
which shall be the formula of that par tic u lar emotion; such that when 
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the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, 
the emotion is immediately evoked.”53 Fortunately, Eliot thinks, we have 
a way of recognizing which of our emotions can be “evoked” in this way 
and which of them cannot; we have something modeled after what Irving 
Babbitt (one of Eliot’s professors in graduate school) had called an “in-
ner check or principle of vital control,” a way of distinguishing which 
aspects of our experience are communicable.54 Eliot argues in “Hamlet 
and his Problems” that Shakespeare, in writing that play, failed to exer-
cise such an inner check; therefore his play is a failure and its author’s 
intentions forever unclear: “under compulsion of what experience he at-
tempted to express the inexpressibly horrible, we cannot ever know.”55 
Those critics who search in poetry for an “expression of personality,” 
when personality is defi ned in this way, are doomed to failure.
The pro- expressionist infl uence on Eliot is equally discernible, in 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in the same passage from which I 
cited above. “Poetry . . .  is not the expression of personality, but an es-
cape from personality. But, of course,” Eliot goes on, “only those who 
have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape 
from these things.”56 The qualifi cation is just as important as the slogan 
that precedes it, for this “want[ing] to escape” ourselves is itself a fact 
about ourselves; poetry can therefore not be understood except as the 
manifestation of an inner tension arising within a collective subject, 
“those who want to escape.” Eliot’s version of the poet’s “inner check” 
militates against the straightforward repre sen ta tion of personality, but 
the technique of verbal “escape” peculiar to the poetic subject is never-
theless an effect of those very same inescapable emotional experiences. 
As Eliot’s famous meta phor of poet- as- catalyst makes clear, poetic repre-
sen ta tion retains nothing of the internal contents of the “personality” that 
produces it; but this absence of correspondence, in and of itself, does 
not distinguish Eliot in any obvious way from a poet like Whitman, who 
had insisted as early as 1855 that “what I experience or portray shall go 
from my composition without a shred of my composition.” What distin-
guishes Eliot from Whitman is the former’s insistence that personality 
needs to be ontologically transfi gured, as it  were, to realize itself in po-
etic discourse; this conviction has its roots in Eliot’s re- importation into 
poetics of the theological notion that personality is a compromised mode 
of existence, always in need of redemption. Eliot’s conviction in the ne-
cessity of this transfi guration, and not his anti- expressionism, is what 
really distinguishes his theory of tradition and the “historical sense” un-
dergirding it— “a perception,” he writes, “not only of the pastness of the 
 Ryan Carr · Toward a Genealogy of Americanist Expressionism 109
J19
past, but of its presence”— from Whitman and Spingarn’s understanding 
of poetic (and critical) expression as a kind of speech that gathers the 
past into the present and thereby reconstitutes it.
Most importantly, Eliot and the expressionists agree that the reso-
lution of the confl icted self’s “wants” must happen symbolically, in dis-
course: “for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a ‘personality’ to 
express, but a par tic u lar medium, which is only a medium and not a 
personality.” Spingarn, who did not believe that poetry was a kind of 
transfi guration, would have found no use for the distinction between 
the self and its mediation. But for this very reason he might have agreed 
with Eliot’s Whitmanian claim that poetry cannot be seen as the repre-
sen ta tion of an antecedent subject. For Eliot, as for Spingarn, it’s the 
instantaneousness— the presence—of poetic utterance that’s key; it’s this 
emphasis that marks his departure, fi nally, from his teacher Babbitt’s the-
ory of the “inner check,” which had been grounded cognitively in “the 
perception on the part of the individual, of a something in himself that 
he possesses in common with other men.”57 Eliot, for his part, refuses 
to believe that what’s collective in a society is available to any individu-
al’s introspection, let alone academic study. The sorts of experience that 
constitute poetry, and by extension the tradition, come to us only through 
discourse— through reading and writing. One does not need to engage 
in these textual activities in order to have a “personality”; they are a com-
pensatory superaddition to human experience and, as such, seem at times 
to take on an institutional and conceptual autonomy in Eliot’s criticism 
as agents of their own reproduction. This may explain why, in an un-
guarded moment in “A Brief Treatise on the Criticism of Poetry,” Eliot 
fi nds himself assimilating criticism itself to the domain of poetic creativ-
ity: “Every form of genuine criticism is directed toward creation. The his-
torical or the philosophical critic of poetry is criticising poetry in order 
to create a history or a philosophy; the poetic critic is criticising poetry 
in order to create poetry.”58 Eliot’s criticism, in this moment, unambigu-
ously announces its imbrication in the refl exive practice of “creative crit-
icism” that Spingarn had introduced into American literary studies. 
Criticism and poetry alike become modalities of an expressive discourse 
that brings a collective literary subject into being.
In “The Perfect Critic,” Eliot would walk back his endorsement of 
creative criticism, insisting on the fundamental unlikeness of critical sub-
jectivity or “intelligence” to criticism’s object of study: “It is fatuous,” he 
concludes, “to say that criticism is for the sake of ‘creation’ or creation 
for the sake of criticism.” “Fatuous,” perhaps, but not necessarily wrong. 
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The fact is that Eliot’s early criticism never decisively answers the fun-
damental question that animates it: does poetry’s power consist in trans-
fi guring the personal into a referential object stripped of any indexical 
relation to an existing subject, or is poetry one among many “media to 
express,” a vector of a historical self-realization capable of fostering soli-
darity, across genres and media, among a collective subject of “escape”? 
This is the question that subsequent critics would fi ght to resolve. For the 
New Critics, Eliot’s recantation of creative criticism would have meant 
that he was on his way to a properly objective or “ontological,” as opposed 
to merely “historical,” criticism, to use the typology developed in John 
Crowe Ransom’s The New Criticism (1941). In hindsight, Eliot’s dalliance 
with Spingarnian notions was a transgression that could be forgiven. The 
general attitude of the New Critics is captured by Cleanth Brooks and Wil-
liam Wimsatt in their Literary Criticism: A Short History: Eliot’s thesis 
that poetry “is not an expression of personality, but an escape from per-
sonality” marks a new era in the history of criticism, “but Eliot, in the way 
in which he argues it, manages to involve himself in the language of ex-
pressionism.”59 Nevertheless, declaring their defi ance of those critics who 
would suggest continuities between Eliot and other expressionists, Wim-
satt and Brooks propose that Eliot’s “language of expressionism” can be 
subjected to what they call a conceptual “pruning operation” and thus 
overlooked as a product of a backward age.60 What could be kept, and was 
essential for the New Critics, was the reformed Eliot’s insistence on the 
mutual irrelevance of critic- as- subject and poem- as- object, a premise 
that Eliot had inherited from Babbitt and had, in his earlier criticism, 
sought to qualify in his famous account of the poet’s expressive transfi g-
uration. The New Critics thus appropriated Eliot by turning him into a 
neo- Babbitt. In the reformed discipline they envisioned, recognizing the 
various “fallacies” brought about by attempting to relate to poems as 
the utterances of subjects was a new way of exercising an “inner check,” 
a way of teaching the self to discriminate between what in one’s encoun-
ter with literature was merely subjective, and what was truly universal.
Although Matthiessen’s The Achievement of T. S. Eliot has often 
been read as a formalist or New Critical text, we are now in a position 
to see that the opposite is in fact the case, that Matthiessen in fact draws 
out the same expressionist strain of Eliot’s thinking that Ransom, Brooks, 
and Wimsatt  were determined to suppress. To be sure, Matthiessen’s 
point of departure was similar to that of the New Critics: in his preface, 
he observes that “the most widespread error in contemporary criticism 
is to neglect form and to concern itself entirely with content” and declares 
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it his aim to work against “the increasing tendency to treat poetry as a 
social document and to forget that it is an art.” 61 But it soon becomes 
apparent that these appeals to critical disciplinarity are made from an 
entirely different conceptual standpoint from that of the New Critics. 
Whereas the latter  were concerned, in their readings of Eliot and else-
where, to overcome the fallacies of critical subjectivity by grounding 
criticism’s scientifi city in the ontological specifi city of its object of 
study, Matthiessen sets out to show that Eliot’s project is the expression 
of a collective historical subject that is historical and distinctively “mod-
ern.” In his fi rst chapter he reads “Tradition and the Individual Talent” 
alongside Eliot’s 1930 essay on Baudelaire in order to show that, for 
Eliot, “the thing of highest importance for the poet is to ‘express with 
individual differences the general state of mind, not as a duty, but simply 
because’—if he possesses that rare, unyielding honesty which alone will 
give his work depth— ‘he cannot help participating in it.’ ” 62 Matthies-
sen’s citation, it must be said, bears only a tangential relation to “Tradi-
tion and the Individual Talent,” which has nothing at all to say about the 
“general state of mind” in any single historical moment, but it helps clar-
ify what Matthiessen might have had in mind when he spoke in his pref-
ace as an advocate of “form” and opponent of “document[ary]” criticism: 
“form” is not an object but an event in the history of a subject, an event 
whose carrying- off depends on an ethical attitude of “honesty.” For Mat-
thiessen, “honesty” describes the kind of expression that is most at a pre-
mium in an age when “modern educated man possesses a knowledge of 
the past to a degree hardly glimpsed a century ago” and thus fi nds him-
self tormented by a paralyzing “self- consciousness.” 63 In his effort to 
demonstrate how “keenly aware” Eliot is of “our contemporary histori-
cal consciousness, and of the problems it creates,” Matthiessen fi nds 
himself drawn to Eliot’s “tragic” poems, in which the bleakness of mod-
ern life becomes salient not because of the way it provides raw material 
for social “documentation” but because it provides an occasion for the 
poet to prove his capacity for speaking with honesty, for undertaking 
“the unfl inching, if agonized, expression of what he knows to be true”:
Through the completeness of his portrayal of the almost insup-
portable conditions of human existence, he frees his audience 
from the oppression of fear; and stirring them to new heart by his 
pre sen ta tion of a heroic struggle against odds, he also enables 
them to conceive anew the means of sustaining and improving 
their own lives.64
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It’s  here, more than anywhere  else in his writings, that Matthiessen iden-
tifi es himself as a follower of the expressionist turn that his pre de ces-
sors Whitman and Spingarn had helped bring into the literary disciplines. 
Setting aside those aspects of Eliot’s literary theory that would militate 
against understanding poetry as a mode of collective self- becoming, Mat-
thiessen identifi es expression as a “pre sen ta tion of a heroic struggle 
against odds,” a medium for the collective overcoming of the limitations 
emergent within historical experience.
For Matthiessen, this conceptual renovation of expression had im-
plications that  were at once scholarly and po liti cal. In scholarly terms, 
it helped ensure literary criticism’s disciplinary specifi city by identifying 
literary form with the “completeness of the portrayal” of the quandaries 
of history. The gathering of modernity’s contradictions into a “uni-
fi ed” utterance establishes the co- presence of writer and reader by 
conveying what Matthiessen calls “the actual sensation of life”: “litera-
ture,” as he puts it, “must certainly end with giving a sense of life.” 65 
Whereas Wimsatt and Beardsley would argue in “The Affective Fal-
lacy” that “though cultures have changed and will change, poems re-
main and explain,” Matthiessen fi nds in Eliot the makings of a historical 
understanding of criticism’s object of study and of its discipline of read-
ing, both of which are specifi c to the collective subject called “modern 
educated man.” 66
Literature’s po liti cal potential lies in its capacity to bring about the 
progressive self- realization of this same collective subject;  here, the rel-
evant phrase in the passage cited above is “free[ing] them from the op-
pression of fear,” a phrase that marks a clear departure from Eliot’s 
insistence that poetry undoes itself when it strives to “express the inex-
pressibly horrible.” For Eliot, man’s original fallibilities  were simply too 
constraining for poetry to be anything other than an “escape from per-
sonality”; he could not redeem himself spiritually through his own worldly 
activities, in poetry or in politics. Yet Matthiessen— who, like Whitman, 
believes that self- expression is its own kind of progress— sees Eliot’s 
work as proving the opposite point, that “the mature artists fi nds his 
strength partly by coming to recognize and reckon with his limitations.” 67 
The task of modern man is coping with his own limitations, by himself. 
Matthiessen would make this somewhat more concrete in the preface 
to the second edition of the Eliot book (1947): “My growing divergence 
from [Eliot’s] view of life,” he writes, “is that I believe that it is possible 
to accept the ‘radical imperfection’ of man, and yet to be a po liti cal radical 
as well, to be aware that no human society can be perfect, and yet to 
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hold that the proposition ‘all men are created equal’ demands dynamic 
adherence from a Christian no less than a demo crat.” 68 No reader of 
American Re nais sance will be surprised to fi nd Matthiessen, in such a 
passage, recalibrating his own relation to postwar geopolitics. And yet 
it’s worth keeping in mind that it’s only in 1947, twelve years following 
his book’s fi rst appearance, that Matthiessen fi nds it necessary to read 
Eliot’s work in light of the markedly American doctrine that “all men are 
created equal.” The Achievement of T. S. Eliot thus assimilated itself to 
the disciplinary history of American Studies, but only contingently: it doc-
uments the gradual pro cess through which expressionism and Ameri-
can Studies found that they  were a perfect match for each other. The 
match was mutually benefi cial. In the discourse of expressionism, those 
who (like Matthiessen, ultimately) would advocate for the historical sin-
gularity of the American nation found a way of doing so in a disciplin-
ary way that— however prejudiced it may have been in favor of white 
northern males— avoided the essentialist supposition of a fi xed Ameri-
can character. And at the same time, the disciplinary subject of expres-
sionism, increasingly beleaguered by the assaults of “scientifi c” criticism, 
found in American Studies a durable institutional location within which 
it could operate in relative insulation from anti- expressionist polemics.
Matthiessen’s effort to constitute a critical Americanist subject has 
troubled readers as frequently as it has inspired them, but it set the 
terms for the future of the discipline. In his turn and return to Eliot and 
in American Re nais sance, we can witness the beginning of the still- 
ongoing pro cess through which the disciplinary subject of Americanist 
expressionism— the critical “we”— has set itself to the task of reimagin-
ing its po liti cal affi liations. This pro cess of reimagination has outlasted 
Matthiessen’s national and sociocultural prejudices, allowing American-
ist scholars to recognize and also to experiment with modes of expres-
sive subjectivity that only occasionally identify themselves as American 
and indeed frequently oppose the very idea of a national literature. The 
expressive subjects who are both the agents and objects of Americanist 
criticism, in other words, have from the very beginning been subject to 
reconstitution.
The best evidence of the resiliency of Matthiessen’s expressionism 
comes from his most hostile critics. Time and again, skeptics have in-
sisted that Matthiessen studied the wrong authors and cultivated the 
wrong kind of critical discipline, but without questioning his central as-
sumption that criticism ought to be a refl exive history of expression. Jane 
Tompkins, for example, concluded her Sensational Designs by proposing 
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that her book and Matthiessen’s  were “competing attempts to consti-
tute American literature”; this reconstitution was necessary because 
“Matthiessen’s modernist critical principles had set at a discount” cer-
tain key works of nineteenth- century literature. And yet, though Tomp-
kins had a great deal to say about Matthiessen’s “modernist” theories of 
art and aesthetics, she deployed expression throughout her study in much 
the same way that Matthiessen himself had: her “notion of literary texts 
as doing work, expressing and shaping the social context that produced 
them,” extends but in no way refutes Matthiessen’s thesis that the “con-
centrated moment of expression” upon which he had focused was, in the 
last instance, relevant because it was a fulfi llment of the “possibilities 
of democracy.” 69 Matthiessen’s expressionism fl ies under the radar of cri-
tique even more strikingly in Jonathan Arac’s “F. O. Matthiessen: Autho-
rizing an American Re nais sance.” Arac proposes early on in his essay 
“to explore in some detail Matthiessen’s title” and proceeds to devote 
 whole paragraphs to the words “American,” “Re nais sance,” “Art,” “Age,” 
and “Emerson and Whitman”— but he has nothing at all about to say about 
what Matthiessen might have meant by the term “expression,” or about 
whether his usage of that term confi rms Arac’s general thesis that Amer-
ican Re nais sance is a self- contradicting work.70 This omission reveals 
a contradiction in Arac’s own argument that “to create the centrally au-
thoritative critical identity of American Re nais sance, much had to be 
displaced or scattered or disavowed,” especially since the “modern crit-
ical practice” Arac ascribes to Matthiessen had supposedly “required 
abandoning the modes of ‘impressionist’ reading, the orientation 
that M. H. Abrams has called ‘expressive.’ ”71 We are thus confronted with 
a paradox that Arac leaves unresolved: on the one hand, Matthiessen is 
said to subscribe to a modernist “discipline of letters” that requires him 
to leave the expressive theory of poetry behind; on the other, he is shown 
to introduce into that same discipline a concept— expression— that is 
strangely unsusceptible to metacritical interrogation. Despite Arac and 
Tompkins’s best efforts to negate the “discipline of letters” they thought 
Matthiessen had imposed upon American literary studies, they them-
selves could not say no to expressionism. All they could do was drive it 
underground, obscuring the disciplinary continuity that linked their own 
critical moment to the age of Spingarn, Lewisohn, and Matthiessen 
himself. Inadvertently, then, the “New Americanist” misidentifi cation of 
Matthiessen as a “Modernist” effected the reconstitution of the old 
Americanist discipline of expressionism, which has perdured down to 
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our own time— “buried,” but nevertheless profoundly imbricated with the 
reproduction of critical knowledge.
Americanists in the twenty- fi rst century may have forgotten about 
expressionism, but they continue to live with it, and its problems. Today 
as much as ever, scholars risk falling back on the paralogism that has 
beset expressionist criticism since the days of Lewisohn: the notion that 
expression is the telos of all utterance, rather than a historically specifi c 
technique of self- mediation. Nevertheless, a genealogy of expressionism 
is one way in which Americanist criticism can tell a true history of it-
self, a history that makes sense of the disciplinary past in a way that can 
orient criticism to the scholarly and po liti cal struggles of the present. 
Above all, at a time of widespread methodological dissensus, the gene-
alogy of expression raises fundamental questions of disciplinary iden-
tity: should interpretation aspire to refl exivity, to offer an account of its 
object of study that is also an account of itself? In what ways can we 
imagine criticism affi rming its status as a practice of mediated solidar-
ity, what Sheldon Pollock calls a “practice of attachment?” How can stu-
dents trained in what has historically been a nationally or ga nized fi eld 
of knowledge understand their research as relevant to the study of mo-
dernity in general? In the past, expressionism has shown that it has an-
swers to these questions, answers that can be redeployed in the present 
to justify and explain a range of critical activities, some of which Amer-
icanists are already undertaking, and some of which might not yet ex-
ist. If such re- imaginings seem desirable, it may be time to recommit to 
expression as an object of study and scholarly ethic. Or perhaps it is time 
to start talking about something  else.
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